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Abstract: With the number of new mobile malware instances increasing by over 50% annually since 2012 [25], malware
embedding in mobile apps is arguably one of the most serious security issues mobile platforms are exposed
to. While obfuscation techniques are successfully used to protect the intellectual property of apps’ developers,
they are unfortunately also often used by cybercriminals to hide malicious content inside mobile apps and
to deceive malware detection tools. As a consequence, most of mobile malware detection approaches fail in
differentiating between benign and obfuscated malicious apps. We examine the graph features of mobile apps
code by building weighted directed graphs of the API calls, and verify that malicious apps often share structural
similarities that can be used to differentiate them from benign apps, even under a heavily “polluted” training set
where a large majority of the apps are obfuscated. We present DaDiDroid an Android malware app detection
tool that leverages features of the weighted directed graphs of API calls to detect the presence of malware code
in (obfuscated) Android apps. We show that DaDiDroid significantly outperforms MaMaDroid [24], a recently
proposed malware detection tool that has been proven very efficient in detecting malware in a clean non-
obfuscated environment. We evaluate DaDiDroid’s accuracy and robustness against several evasion techniques
using various datasets for a total of 43,262 benign and 20,431 malware apps. We show that DaDiDroid
correctly labels up to 96% of Android malware samples, while achieving an 91% accuracy with an exclusive
use of a training set of obfuscated apps.
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Android OS and mobile applica-
tions (apps in short) have experienced an exponential
growth with over 3 Million apps on Google Play [15]
in 2017. This popularity naturally attracted malware
developers leading to a continuous 50% yearly in-
crease of the number of malware apps for over five
years [25]. Several research studies (e.g., [20, 18,
12]) focused on dynamic runtime-network analysis
to detect potential malicious behaviour of Android
apps. Another line of research (e.g., [23, 4, 8, 1])
aimed to reduce the resources required to perform dy-
namic analysis by adopting static code analysis ap-
proaches [20, 19]. DroidAPIMiner [1], for instance,
uses the frequency of API calls to classify malware
apps. Recently, MaMaDroid [24] leverages the simi-
larity in the code of apps as extracted from the transi-
tion probabilities between different API calls to build
an efficient Android malware detection system. How-
ever, the increased code complexity and the use of ob-
fuscation techniques as a way to protect apps from
code theft, reverse engineering and code inspection,
pose several challenges to static analysis of malware
apps.
In this paper, we set the objective of building
an effective mobile malware detection tool that is
resistant to code obfuscation techniques. We pro-
pose DaDiDroid, a tool that runs static code analysis,
leveraging apps’ API call graphs to characterize the
functional behaviour of apps and filter out malicious
behaviour, even in presence of an obfuscated code.
Specifically, DaDiDroid builds, for each Android app,
the API families calls graph (e.g., API packages such
as android.util.log are abstracted to android) and ex-
tracts the weighted directed graphs features (we use
23 unique graph features) to model the Android app
behaviour. Using the graph features, we then rely on
a classifier to establish whether or not the directed
weighted graph belongs to a benign app.
This paper makes the following contributions:
Open Source Malware Detection Tool: We
present our open source1 malware detection tool, Da-
DiDroid, that leverages features from the weighted di-
rected graph representation of apps’ API calls (§ 3).
Efficacy of Graph Features: We empirically
evaluate our proposed system and demonstrate the ef-
1For further research, we plan to release DaDiDroid to
the research community.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
09
13
6v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
2 J
un
 20
19
ficacy of the graph features as peculiar features dis-
tinguishing between benign and malicious apps. We
use a combination of six publicly available datasets
to evaluate the effectiveness of DaDiDroid and deter-
mine that, in a clean environment (i.e., no obfuscation
used by apps) it detects malware apps with an accu-
racy of 96.5%. We present the distributions of some
selected graph features to show how they could be
used as discriminating features of (obfuscated) mal-
ware and benign apps.
Comparison against MaMaDroid: We empir-
ically show (cf. § 5 and § 5.3) that the accuracy of
MaMaDroid, a recent static analysis mobile malware
detection tool, is heavily dependent of the balance in
the training dataset as captured by the ratio of benign
versus malicious apps. In addition, we show that Ma-
MaDroid is prone to obfuscation techniques with a
generated false negatives as high as 86.3%.
DaDiDroid’s Robustness Against Obfuscation:
We show that DaDiDroid is robust against several
code obfuscation techniques. With no obfuscated
apps present in the training set, DaDiDroid accurately
classifies 91.2% of all obfuscated apps2, an average
17.7% higher success rates when compared to Ma-
MaDroid.
2 OVERVIEW OF OBFUSCATION
TECHNIQUES
An Android app package (i.e., APK) comes a
compressed file containing all the module and con-
tent. Generally, the compressed APK include: four
directories (res, assets, lib, and META-INF) and
three files (AndroidManifest.xml, classes.dex, and re-
sources.arsc). Among these components, classes.dex
contains Java classes of an app, organized in a way
the Dalvik virtual machine can interpret and execute.
In general, obfuscation attempts to obscure a pro-
gram and makes the source code3 more difficult for
humans to understand, to evade malware detection
tools, or both. Developers can deliberately obfuscate
code (i.e., Java classes in classes.dex) to protect app’s
(malicious) logic or purpose, prevent tampering, or to
deter reverse engineering efforts. Common obfusca-
tion techniques used by apps include:
Call Indirection: This involves the manipulation
of apps’ call graphs by calling any two methods from
each others. In essence, in this obfuscation technique,
a method invocation is moved into a new method
which, in turn, is invoked in place of the original
2Android apps that use several code obfuscation tech-
niques, further reviewed in § 2 and discussed in § 5.3.
3Some obfuscation techniques may also attempt to
transform machine code, however, in this work we consider
source code obfuscation techniques.
method.
String Encoding and Encryption: Strings are
very common-used data structures in software devel-
opment. In an obfuscated app, strings could be en-
crypted to prevent information leakage. Based on
cryptographic functions, the original plain texts are
replaced by random strings and restore at runtime.
As a result, string encryption could effectively hinder
hard-coded static scanning.
Packing: In this obfuscation, an APK file is com-
posed of an origin APK and a wrapper APK. Gen-
erally, a wrapper APK launches the origin APK into
memory and executes it on Android devices. A wrap-
per APK may employ encryption to hide (or limit ac-
cess to) the original APK which are decrypted at run-
time thus often evade static code analysis.
Identifier Renaming: In software development,
for good readability, code identifiers’ names are usu-
ally meaningful, though developers may follow dif-
ferent naming rules. However, these meaningful
names also accommodate reverse-engineers to un-
derstand the code logic and locate the target func-
tions rapidly. Therefore, to reduce the potential in-
formation leakage, the identifier’s name could be
replaced by a meaningless string. Generally, with
this obfuscation technique, a given API’s name such
as myApp.net.myPackage is transformed to at most
three-letters words such as a.bc.def.
3 THE DADIDROID SYSTEM
Figure 1 depicts an overview of the four steps of
the DaDiDroid’s malware detection system. By lever-
aging source code analysis and graph theory, we ex-
tract APIs call graphs of Android apps (step 1) and
then model the relationships among APIs (step 2). We
use various graph features (step 3) and machine learn-
ing algorithms (step 4) to classify apps. We provide
details of these steps in the following.
APIs Call Graph Extraction: We aim to model
the behaviour of apps (benign and malware) from the
API calls in the source code. To this end, the first
step in DaDiDroid is to extract the apps’ call4 graphs
by performing static analysis on the apps’ APKs (An-
droid Apps packages). We use Soot [30], a Java opti-
mization and analysis framework, to extract API call
graphs and then instrument FlowDroid (v2.5) [5] to
extract dependencies among the APIs.
Our intuition is that malware may use calls for var-
ious operations, in a different graph structure, than be-
4An Android often requires user’s interactions to switch
back to app’s main GUI. The switching among apps GUIs
as programming is termed method callback or simply call-
back. For ease of presentation, we use a generic term,
“call”, to also denote callback.
nign apps (further elaborated in Section 5.1). To en-
sure the benign graph structures are different enough
from the malicious ones, we abstract API calls pack-
age to their respective families.
The APIs calls abstractions refers to all possible
calls of APIs from every and each API present in the
code. That is, for each app in our dataset (see Ta-
ble 1), we determine all possible calls amongst the
APIs. For instance, as depicted in Figure 1 (step
1), we find that the API call com.fac.ex:Execute()
instantiates the functions android.util.log:d() and
java.lang.Throwable:getMessage(). For the API fam-
ily abstraction, we first derive the family names of the
APIs and then construct the family call graphs. For
example, from android.net.http and java.sql APIs we
obtain API family names android and java, respec-
tively and build the graph of calls based solely based
on the family names of the APIs.
The abstraction provides resilience to API
changes in the Android framework as families are of-
ten added and deprecated less frequently than single
API calls. At the same time, this does not abstract
away the behavior of an app. As families include
classes as well as interfaces used to perform similar
operations on set of similar objects, we can model
the types of operations from the family names inde-
pendently of modifications, if any, in the underlying
classes and interfaces. For instance, we know that the
java.sql package is used for database input, output,
and update operations even though there are differ-
ent classes and interfaces provided by the package for
such operations.
Developer may extend the functionalities of their
apps by importing a self-defined API. As mentioned
earlier, developers also often resort to obfuscate the
APIs in the source code. To capture the self-defined
and obfuscated APIs in during our call graph extrac-
tion process, we rely on previous work [24] and in-
troduce two types of family names in our APIs calls
abstraction: self-defined and obfuscated. We rely on
previous works [28] [24] to further determine the dif-
ference between these two APIs. In essence, we de-
fine that an API is obfuscated if either at least 50%
of its functions or methods are at most 3 characters
(see § 5.3 for further details) or if we cannot tell what
its class implements, extends, or inherits, due to iden-
tifier mangling [28]. When operating in API abstrac-
tion level, we abstract an API call to its package name
using the list of Android packages, which as of An-
droid OS v8.0 [16] includes 243 Android and 101
Google APIs.
DaDiDroid detects if malware developers at-
tempt to define their “self-defined” APIs such as
com.google.MyMalware with API names com.google
(or family name com). The derived lists of An-
droid and Google APIs and classes ensure the de-
tection of any attempt that malware developers may
perform to evade DaDiDroid by naming their self-
defined APIs to legal android and google APIs such as
com.google.MyMalware which could have been ab-
stracted as com.google without APIs classes whitelist.
Overall, for Android API Level 26 [16], we ob-
tain 387 distinct APIs and 12 different families (An-
droid, dalvik, java, javax, junit, apache, json, com,
xml, google, self-defined, and obfuscated). We evalu-
ated DaDiDroid in family and API abstraction modes.
We observe that DaDiDroid’s results were similar to
that of its operation in API abstraction mode. To ease
presentation, in § 5, we present our analysis of Da-
DiDroid operating in family abstraction mode.
Graph Generation: Next, we model the relation-
ships among API calls (resp. API families) in the An-
droid apps as weighted, directed graph G(V,E,W).
As DaDiDroid uses static analysis, the graph obtained
from Soot and FlowDroid represents the flow of func-
tions that are potentially called by the app. Each node
in V corresponds to a unique API call (resp. API
family name) in the Android app. A directed link
(u, v) ∈ E is presented in the graph if and only if an
API, u ∈ V, calls a method in another API, v ∈ V.
A weight w ∈ W represents the number of times u
calls a method in v. Note that the links (u, v, w) and
(v, u, w) may both exist if Android app’s APIs are
calling each other methods reciprocally.
For each Android app, we represent the relation-
ships among API calls (resp. API families) as adja-
cency matrix containing the number of occurrence of
possible transitions from vi to vj .
Features Extraction: Next, we leverage graph
metrics (or features, listed in Table 4) to quantify the
relationship among API calls. As some of the graph
metrics, such as clustering coefficient, are defined
only for undirected graphs, we first convert our di-
rected graphs into a weighted, undirected graphs and
then extract the corresponding graph metrics.
Classification: The last step in DaDiDroid is to
perform classification, i.e., labelling apps as either
benign or malware. To this end, we use a super-
vised two-class Support Vector Machine (SVM) clas-
sifier [26], k-Nearest Nighbours (k-NN) [2], and Ran-
dom Forest [6], all implemented using Weka [17],
an open source machine learning library in Java pro-
gramming language.
We form two classes by labelling malware and
benign apps’ graph features (cf. Table 4) as pos-
itives and negatives, respectively. We use 80% of
the instances for training and 20% for testing. For
two-class SVM, appropriate values for parameters γ
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: d() a.cb.r: abcd()
java.lang.Throw
able: 
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Figure 1: Overview of DaDiDroid: The dashed-arrows represent calls to other functions that are not shown in the figure.
(radial basis function kernel parameter [27]) and υ
(SVM parameter) are set empirically by performing
a greedy grid search on ranges 2−10 ≤ γ ≤ 20 and
2−10 ≤ υ ≤ 20, respectively, on each training dataset.
Likewise, for other classifiers, we perform empirical
tests to set their parameters.
4 DATASET IN USE
Dataset: We use previously published datasets
which include 63,693 Android apps (apk files) con-
sisting of 43,262 benign and 20,431 malware samples.
Table 1 summaries the dataset in use. We aim to ver-
ify that DaDiDroid is robust to the existence of a va-
riety of Android malware samples as well as to het-
erogenous APIs. We then consider a dataset that in-
cludes a mix of obfuscated and non-obfuscated apps
as well as newer and (relatively) older apps with a
publication date ranging from August 2010 to June
2018. Our dataset consists of samples from the fol-
lowing data sources:
Marvin [22]. This source consists of a total of
38,740 apps, constituted from 28,181 benign apps and
10,559 malware samples.
Drebin [4]. It consists of 5,525 malware samples
collected from August 2010 to October 2012.
Old Benign. This dataset includes a sample of
5,879 benign apps collected by PlayDrone [31] be-
tween April and November 2013 and published on the
Internet Archive Machine [3].
New Benign. We use a customised crawler and
unofficial Google Play API [14] to download a sample
of 1,788 free apps, belong to 29 different categories,
from the Google Play. We use VirusTotal to determine
whether or not the app’s embed in their source codes.
ObData I. We obtained this dataset from Garcia et
al., [13] which consists of obfuscated apps employing
various code transformation (i.e., obfuscation) tech-
niques such as Encoding and Call Indirection (ex-
plained later in § 5.3).
ObData II. Apps developers often minify apps’
source code by mapping the API names to names such
as myApp.net.myPackage with at most three let-
ters: a.b.c or a.bc.def (cf. § 5.3). By parsing the
API names that correspond to a given Android app in
the Marvin dataset, we construct a sample of 7,975
apps that employ source code minification technique.
Dataset #Apps # Benign # Malicious Date Range
Marvin [22] 38,740 28,181 10,559 06/12–05/14
Drebin [4] 5,525 - 5,525 08/10–10/12
OldBenign 5,909 5,909 - 04/13–11/13
NewBenign 1,788 1,788 - 06/17–06/17
ObData I [13] 883 - 883 06/12–05/14
ObData II [22] 7,975 5,884 2,091 05/13–03/14
PackedApps [11] 2,873 1,500 1,373 07/16–02/17
Total 63,693 43,262 20,431 08/10–06/18
Table 1: Overview of the datasets used in our analysis. We
obtain two samples of obfuscated apps: We acquire “Ob-
Data I” from authors of [13] and use the Marvin dataset for
obfuscated apps (cf. Section 5.3) to construct “ObData II”.
PackedApps. We obtained this dataset from Dong
et al., [11] which consists of 1,500 and 1,371 packed–
original APK wrapped in another APK–benign and
malicious APKs, respectively.
Datasets Annotation: To analyze the classifica-
tion results of DaDiDroid, we annotate our datasets
considering reports from VirusTotal [32]. VirusTotal
is an online service that aggregates the scanning capa-
bilities provided by more than 68 antivirus (AV) tools,
scanning engines and datasets. It has been widely
used in research literature to detect malicious apps,
executables, software and domains [20]. After com-
pleting the scanning process for a given app, Virus-
Total generates a report that indicates which of the
participating AV scanning tools detected any malware
activity in the app under consideration and the cor-
responding malware signature (if any). By parsing
VirusTotal reports, we extract the number of affiliated
AV tools that identified any malware activity and an-
notate each app in our dataset with the corresponding
results.
5 EVALUATION OF DADIDROID
In this section, we present a detailed experimental
evaluation of DaDiDroid.
5.1 The Intuition
We first conduct preliminary experiments in order to
verify our main intuition that graph features are valu-
able to differentiate benign and malicious apps.
To further analyze the importance of our fea-
tures in classifying malware and benign apps, we use
an information-theoretic metric, information gain ra-
tio [10]. This metric is used to quantify the differ-
entiation power of features i.e., our graph metrics or
features. In this context, information gain is the mu-
tual information between a given graph metricXi and
the class label C ∈ {Benign, Malware}. Formally, for
a given graph feature Xi and the class label C, the
information gain of Xi with respect to C is defined
as:
GainRatio(Xi, C) =
(H(C)−H(C|Xi))
H(Xi)
(1)
where H(Xi) = −
∑
i∈N p(xi)log(p(xi)) denotes the
marginal entropy of the graph feature Xi and H(C|
Xi) represents the conditional entropy of class label
C given graph feature Xi. In other words, informa-
tion gain ratio quantifies the reduction in the uncer-
tainty of the class labelC given that we have the com-
plete knowledge of feature Xi. Figure 2 shows the
information gain ratio of our graph features extracted
from the Marvin dataset and the Drebin dataset (cf.
Table 1). We observe that the “algebraic connectiv-
ity” and the “assortativity” are the most distinct be-
tween benign and malicious apps. This analysis re-
veals that the minimum betweenness centrality (see
Figure 2) and the number of weakly connected com-
ponents (see Figure 2) are insignificant in classifying
malware and benign apps that correspond to Marvin
and Drebin dataset.
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Figure 2: Information gain ratio of our graph features for
the (a) Marvin dataset and (b) Drebin+Oldbenign dataset.
5.2 Effectiveness of DaDiDroid
Using the datasets summarised in Table 1, we per-
form experiments to analyze the effectiveness of
DaDiDroid’s classification on benign and malicious
samples. We also study the effect of unbalanced train-
ing data on DaDiDroid’s performance. We chose to
compare to MaMaDroid, as the most recent work in
the space, since MaMaDroid also aims to leverage
API-calls to extract probabilistic-features building a
Hidden Markov model of transitions between API
calls.
To assess the accuracy of the classification, we
use the standard F-measure = 2× (precision × recallprecision + recall ),
where precision = TPTP+FP and recall =
TP
TP+FN . TP
means true positives denoting the number of apps cor-
rectly classified as malicious. Likewise, FN (false
negatives) and FP (false positives) indicate the num-
ber of samples mistakenly identified as benign and
malicious, respectively. For all experiments, we per-
form 10-fold cross validation using at least one mali-
cious and one benign dataset from Table 1.
Effectiveness of Classifiers: In order to gener-
alize the classification of DaDiDroid, we use three
machine learning classification algorithms: two-class
SVM, k-NN, and Random Forest.
Table 2 summarizes the performance of the clas-
sifiers. Our results show that the Random Forest clas-
sifier achieves the highest accuracy with an accuracy
of 90% and 96% in classifying malware and benign
drawn from the Drebin+oldbenign and the Marvin
datasets, respectively. Perhaps due to an overfitting
effect in our dataset, two-class SVM showed poor
results and may require further pruning and detailed
analysis of parameters, as well as a selection of the
optimal set of prominent features to improve the clas-
sification performances [21, 6]. We resort to the Ran-
dom Forest classifier as our best classifier and use it
next to compare against MaMaDroid and in our anal-
ysis of the effect of unbalanced training sets as well
as the study of the resilience against the obfuscation
techniques.
Dataset Classifier TP FP Precision Recall FM Accuracy
RF 90.3% 9.7% 90.3% 90.3% 90.3% 90.1 %
Drebin+OB SVM 70.5% 29.2% 71% 70.5% 70.4% 71.4 %
k-NN 86.8% 13.2% 86.8% 86.8% 86.8% 87.3 %
RF 95.7% 6.6% 95.7% 95.7% 95.7% 96.5 %
Marvin SVM 81.8% 32.4% 81.1% 81.8% 81.1% 82.7 %
k-NN 94.1% 9.6% 94% 94.1% 94.1% 94.3 %
Table 2: Performance of our classifiers in classify-
ing malware and benign drawn from Marvin [22] and
Drebin+oldbenign (OB) datasets. Here RM means Random
Forest while FM, TP, FP represent F1-Measure, True Posi-
tives rate and False Positives rate respectively.
Effectiveness of DaDiDroid with Unbalanced
Training Dataset: In order to determine the mini-
mum number of apps required to train DaDiDroid,
we analyze several sets of training and testing datasets
drawn from the Marvin dataset (see in Table 1). Fig-
ure 3 depicts the effect of unbalanced dataset on per-
formance of DaDiDroid (with Random Forest). In the
case of using fixed size of benign apps and various
sets of malware apps (resp. benign apps) in the train-
ing phase, we observe that DaDiDroid outperforms
MaMaDroid with on average 12% higher accuracy.
Moreover, the results also show that DaDiDroid
achieves higher accuracy (96%) in case of limited
number (i.e, 1,500) of benign apps in training phase.
In contrast, MaMaDroid [24] shows vulnerability to
unbalanced training dataset. In Figure 3b, in the case
of using fixed size of malicious apps and a set 1,500
of benign instances in the training phase, we observe
that DaDiDroid outperforms MaMaDroid with on av-
erage 26% higher accuracy.
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Figure 3: Analyzing the effect of unbalanced dataset on the
performance of DaDiDroid (with Random Forest in classi-
fication phase) and MaMaDroid: In (a) we use 2,990 benign
apps and vary sets of malware apps to measure the accuracy
while in (b) we use a fixed size of malware apps (7,390) and
vary the set of benign apps.
5.3 Robustness Against Obfuscation
Techniques
The main goal of obfuscation is to either secure apps’
source codes or to hide apps’ malware components.
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of our
proposed system against several types of obfuscation
techniques.
Whitespace: To reduce the readability of source
code, this (basic) obfuscation technique adds or re-
moves white-spaces in apps source code. As Da-
DiDroid leverages API calls (and API family names)
only, this obfuscation technique should have no effect
on the accuracy of DaDiDroid.
Call Indirection (CI): This involves the manipula-
tion of apps’ call graphs by calling any two methods
from each others. To measure the performance of Da-
DiDroid to Call Indirection, we use the Drebin and
OldBenign datasets (cf. Table 1) for training our clas-
sifiers. We use NewBenign and 210 Call Indirecting
malware apps drawn from ObData I [13] for testing.
Table 3 shows the robustness of DaDiDroid against
this type of obfuscation. We observe that 15 (7%) of
apps, having Call Indirection obfuscation, were clas-
sified as benign. In contrast, MaMaDroid [24] mis-
classified 63 (30%) apps that employ Call Indirection
obfuscation techniques.
String Encoding and Encryption (SEE): With this
obfuscation technique, an app’s developer encodes
the used APIs to unintelligible ones. To evaluate
the performance of DaDiDroid to String Encoding
Obf. Tech. Scheme TP FP P R FM A
DaDiDroid 92.9% 4.5% 70.7% 92.9% 80.2% 95.2%CI MaMaDroid [24] 70.0% 3.5% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 93.7%
DaDiDroid 79.5% 4.5% 86.9% 79.5% 83.1% 91.1%SEE MaMaDroid [24] 13.7% 23.2% 59.4% 13.7% 22.2% 73.8%
DaDiDroid 98.4% 0.9% 97.9% 98.4% 98.2% 98.8%Packing MaMaDroid [24] 98.4% 1.2% 97.5% 98.4% 97.9% 98.7%
DaDiDroid 77.1% 7.1% 91.6% 77.1% 83.7% 95.2%IR MaMaDroid [24] 65.2% 2.2% 70.0% 96.8.0% 77.8% 65.2%
DaDiDroid 82.7% 4.5% 90.1% 82.7% 86.2% 91.2%CI+SEE+Packing+IR MaMaDroid [24] 27.1% 3.5% 79.1% 27.1% 40.3% 73.5%
Table 3: Comparison of our proposed system, DaDiDroid,
with MaMaDroid on obfuscated datasets (cf. Section 4).
Here RM means Random Forest while P, R, and A represent
precision, recall, and accuracy, respectively.
and Encryption, we use the Drebin and OldBenign
datasets (cf. Table 1) for training our classifiers. We
use NewBenign and 673 malware apps, with this ob-
fuscation technique, drawn from ObData I [13] for
testing. Table 3 shows the robustness of DaDiDroid
against String Encoding and Encryption obfuscation.
We found that 20% of apps, having String Encod-
ing and Encryption obfuscation, were classified as be-
nign. In contrast, MaMaDroid [24] results in 86% of
false negatives.
Packing: With this obfuscation technique, an app’s
developer wraps the original APKs inside another
APKs. To evaluate the performance of DaDiDroid
to packing obfuscation, we use 80% and 20% of the
PackedApps dataset (cf. Table 1) for training and test-
ing our classifiers, respectively, and use 10-fold cross
validation in our experiments. Table 3 shows the ro-
bustness of DaDiDroid against Packing obfuscation.
We found that 1.6% of apps, having Packing obfus-
cation, were classified as benign. In contrast, Ma-
MaDroid [24] results in 1.2% of false positives.
Identifier Renaming: With Identifier Renaming, a
given API’s name such as myApp.net.myPackage is
transformed to at most three-letters words such as
a.bc.def. By parsing the API names that correspond to
a given Android app in Marvin dataset, we determine
this type of obfuscation in our datasets. In essence,
leveraging previous works [28, 24], we define that an
API is obfuscated if either at least 50% of its functions
or methods are at most 3 characters or if we cannot
tell what its class implements, extends or inherits due
to identifier mangling [28].
We draw apps with no Identifier Renaming from
Marvin dataset to train MaMaDroid and DaDiDroid
and use ObData II (cf. Table 2) to measure their
robustness against minification. Once again, we use
80% and 20% of the data for training and testing, re-
spectively, and use 10-fold cross validation in our ex-
periments.
Table 3 overviews and Figure 4 further illumi-
nates on the robustness of DaDiDroid against Identi-
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Figure 4: Robustness of DaDiDroid against Identifier Re-
naming (or minification): (a) F1-Measure and accuracy; and
(b) false negatives and false positives.
fier Renaming. With increasing proportions of apps
that employ Identifier Renaming, in Figure 4a, we
observe a decreasing trend in DaDiDroid’s and Ma-
MaDroid’s performance. When tested with 100% of
ObData II, we observe that DaDiDroid outperforms
MaMaDroid: F1-Measure of MaMaDroid drops from
87% to 78% whereas we notice merely 5% (from
88% to 83%) decrease in DaDiDroid’s F1-Measure.
In Figure 4b, we notice that minimification mainly
affects the number of false negatives. With 83% of
F1-Measure, DaDiDroid miss-classifies only 20% of
the malware apps in testing dataset as benign. In
contrasts, besides its lower F1-Measure (78%), Ma-
MaDroid results in 35% of false negatives. Overall,
for its high F1-Measure and low false negatives, Da-
DiDroid pays a very reasonable cost of 7% of false
positives rate.
Overall, when tested on samples of benign and
malware apps that involve four types obfuscation
techniques, we observe (cf. Table 3) that DaDiDroid
outperforms MaMaDroid with on average 46.2% and
17.7%, respectively, higher F1-Measure and accuracy,
however, with a cost of 1% higher false positive rate
than that of MaMaDroid.
6 RELATED WORK
A number of studies have characterised and de-
tected malicious activities in Android apps. Sev-
eral works [20, 18, 12, 9] rely on dynamic runtime-
network analysis to detect potential malicious be-
haviour of Android apps. To reduce the resource re-
quired in performing dynamic analysis, a large body
of works [23, 4, 8] perform static code analysis to
detect malware component in Android apps. How-
ever, due recent development in obfuscation tech-
niques and malware developers’ affinity to obfuscate
their apps [11], static analysis of Android malware
apps is an active research topic. CrowDroid [7] per-
formed dynamic analysis apps network traces to de-
tect malware activities of Android apps. By col-
lecting sequence of requests sent to remote servers,
it built features vectors that consisted of number
of calls of a specific API to differentiate malware
apps from benign apps. Drebin [4] performed static
analysis of API calls and requests to permission.
It also analyzed hard-coded URLs in apps’ source
codes to determine apps’ benign or malicious activ-
ities. DroidApiMiner [1] proposed a new approach
by using the frequencies of API calls to sensitive
APIs. StormDroid [8] improved the detection of
DroidApiMiner by analyzing APIs calls sequences
along with the API calls frequencies analysis.
Similarly, MaMaDroid [24] improved the in-
efficiency of both DroidAPIMiner and Storm-
Droid [8] by using the transitions probabilities among
API calls as features. However, we empirically an-
alyzed that MaMaDroid is dependent on the type of
data used for training (i.e., apps categories, ratio be-
nign on malicious apps, and apps release dates) and is
prone to obfuscation techniques (see Section 5.3) em-
ployed by malware apps. Overall, these techniques
focused on sensitive API calls and privileged per-
missions that often lead to high false positives: a
large number of benign apps often use sensitive API
calls and request permissions for certain function-
alities thus they are wrongly classified as malware.
Moreover, these solutions seldom detect obfuscated
malware components in apps, resulting in poor per-
formance. Zhang et al., [33] used weighted graph
models, extracted from Android apps’ codes seman-
tics, to quantify the similarities among malware apps.
In contrast, we used metrics derived from weight di-
rected graphs to differentiate among benign and mal-
ware apps. To analyze malicious software in desktop
computing platform, GZero [29] collected the call se-
quences of software executables to build graph the-
oretic features. In the same spirit, in this work, we
extracted an extended set of graph features and used
showed the efficacy of graph theoretic metrics in clas-
sifying benign and malware apps. Moreover, we eval-
uate the robustness of our proposed scheme against
unbalanced datasets as well as shown its resiliency
against several type obfuscation techniques.
7 CONCLUSION
We presented DaDiDroid, an obfuscation resilient
tool to detect Android malware based on modeling the
API calls as a weighted, directed graph. We evaluated
the effectiveness of DaDiDroid with several datasets
and tested its robustness against different types of ob-
fuscations. We shown that DaDiDroid classify up to
96.5% of benign and malicious apps. In worst case,
when no obfuscated apps in training set and testing
set contain all obfuscated apps (i.e., apps “Encoding”
obfuscation technique), DaDiDroid achieved 91.2%
of accuracy with only 17.3% of false negative rate
and 4.5 false positive rate. Moreover, DaDiDroid
use small features vectors which can be customized
with more or less features from the graph theory and
even the extraction process depending on the con-
text of the classification. We compared DaDiDroid
to MaMaDroid [24], a Markov chain modeling tool
for Android apps, showing that beside achieving sim-
ilar high results on common datasets, DaDiDroid is
much more resilient to changes in the datasets and es-
pecially to obfuscation techniques. In the future we
plan to improve DaDiDroid by complementing fea-
tures derived from dynamic runtime analysis of apps.
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Feature Description
Graph Size Denotes number of edges (i.e., relationships) of a node (i.e., API or family) in a graph.
Graph Order Corresponds to the number nodes in a graph.
Number of Cycles A cycle is a path of edges and vertices wherein a vertex is reachable from itself.
Degree Assortativity Coefficient In a Directed graph, in-assortativity and out-assortativity measure the tendencies of nodes to
connect with other nodes that have similar in and out degrees as themselves, respectively. To
compute this feature we use the Pearson correlation approach which is way faster and provide
representative results. Positive values of assortivity coefficient, r, indicates a correlation be-
tween nodes of similar degree, while negative values indicate relationships between nodes of
different degree. In general, r lies between −1 and 1. When r = 1, the network is said to have
perfect assortative mixing patterns, when r = 0 the network is non-assortative, while at r = −1
the network is completely disassortative.
Strongly Connected Components The number of strongly connected components. A vertex vi is said to be strongly connected if
it is reachable from every other vertex vk.
Weakly Connected Components A weakly connected component is a maximal subgraph of a directed graph such that for every
pair of vertices (u, v) in the subgraph, there is an undirected path from u to v and a directed
path from v to u.
Node Connectivity The node connectivity is the minimum number of nodes that must be removed to disconnect G.
Avg. Shortest Path Length Average shortest path length is a concept in network topology that is defined as the average
number of steps along the shortest paths for all possible pairs of network nodes.
Degree Centrality The degree centrality a vertex vi is the fraction of nodes it is connected to.
Betweenness Centrality Measures the fraction of all pair shortest paths, except those originating or terminating at it, that
pass through it, 2I(Pjk,i)|V |(|V |−1) , where Pjk denote the shortest path from vertex vj to vertex vk, Pjk
= (vj , vl, vm, vn, ..., vk) and I(Pjk, i) = 1 if vi ∈ Pjk otherwise I(Pjk, i) = 0 when vi Pjk.
Vitality Closeness vitality of a node is the change in the sum of distances between all node pairs when
excluding that node.
Attracting Components An attracting component in a directed graph G is a strongly connected component with the
property that a random walker on the graph will never leave the component, once it enters the
component.
Graph Density It measures number of edges of graph is close to the maximum number of edges.
Clustering coefficient It is a measure of the degree to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster together.
Algebraic connectivity The algebraic connectivity (also known as Fiedler value or Fiedler eigenvalue) of a graph G is
the second-smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of G. This eigenvalue is greater than 0
if and only if G is a connected graph. This is a corollary to the fact that the number of times 0
appears as an eigenvalue in the Laplacian is the number of connected components in the graph.
Clique Number It corresponds to the size (number of vertices V ) of the largest clique of the graph. A clique
C in an undirected graph is a subset of the vertices such that every two distinct vertices are
adjacent.
Biconnected Components They are maximal subgraphs such that the removal of a node (and all edges incident on that
node) will not disconnect the subgraph.
Diameter The diameter of a graph is the maximum eccentricity of any vertex in the graph. The eccentricity
(v) of a graph vertex vi in a connected graph G is the maximum graph distance between vi
and any other vertex vj of G.
Radius The radius r of a graph G is the minimum eccentricity of any vertex.
Center Number The center is the set of nodes with eccentricity equal to radius, r.
Periphery Number The periphery is the set of nodes with eccentricity equal to the diameter.
Table 4: List of our graph metrics (or features) to quantify the relationship among API calls as well API families.
